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1.Introduction 
Anyone who has viewed a slow-motion replay or a movie created using time-lapse 
photography is familiar with high-speed or slow-motion experiences of events. Such 
experiences are an eerie counterpoint to our ordinary perceptual awareness of events 
playing out in time, both because familiar processes are presented at an abnormal rate, 
but also because processes and temporal patterns that would otherwise be invisible come 
to light. In the case of time-lapse movie of, say, the growth of a plant or fungus, not only 
are we presented with events as changing much faster than they really are, but we become 
directly aware of otherwise unperceivable temporal patterns, such as the plants shooting 
towards the sunlight, or wrapping their tendrils around another object for support. Or in 
slow-motion, we might perceive the flapping of a hummingbird’s wings, a process far too 
rapid to perceive in real time, given the limited temporal resolution of the human visual 
system.  
It doesn’t take a huge leap of the imagination to suppose that individuals might have such 
experiences of the world in their normal state. After all, our capacity to experience 
temporal relations presumably evolved to make us perceptually sensitive to 
environmental changes over a fairly limited range of durations and temporal frequencies 
that are relevant for our idiosyncratic purposes. Other creatures with different perceptual 
needs might be specialized to perceive a quite different range of temporal phenomena, 
perhaps meaning that they are permanently enveloped in an experiential world where 
everything changes far more slowly or quickly than in the world of human perception. 
Perhaps a hummingbird’s experience of an object moving rapidly through the visual field 
is like the experience you would have of an object moving far more slowly through the 
same trajectory; or perhaps unlike you they would be unable to experience it all, in much 
the way you are unable to perceive the motion of a speeding bullet or the stars in the 
night sky. In this way there might be systematic variation in the subjective rate of time’s 
passage that is normal for different individuals. 
A more localized form of variation may happen within the conscious experience of 
ordinary individuals. This is illustrated by the existence of temporal illusions that have 
been shown to be induced by certain stimuli (see Eagleman (2008) for a review of recent 
examples in the empirical literature). For example, in the “oddball” effect a subject is 
presented with a series of identical, equally spaced stimuli of a certain fixed duration that 
are interrupted by an “oddball” with saliently different features – e.g. it is larger, a 
different shape, or it is moving (see e.g. Tse at al (2004)). The oddball objectively lasts 
the same amount of time as the other stimuli, but vividly appears to last longer. Such 
cases seem to involve a transient stretching or dilating of experience of a kind that we are 
imagining happening more globally in the cases just described. 
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My interest here is not in whether such variation in subjective rate of passage – whether 
transient or global - is really possible (although I think it is), but rather in what it would 
consist in were it possible. We might think that we need to appeal to a distinction 
between objective duration and subjective duration to make sense of these cases. But 
what exactly is subjective duration? A tempting idea is that temporally extended portions 
of the stream of consciousness have a property we might call “phenomenal duration” that 
in some sense provides a measure of how long an experience “feels” to its subject, and 
that different rates of passage consist in the stream of experience flowing at different 
rates through the window of awareness, as measured by this subjective metric. A 
transient duration illusion would consist in a literal warping of the fabric of 
consciousness, a portion of your experience having a longer subjective duration than it 
should, resulting in an illusory presentation of the duration of some external event. 
My main contention in this paper is that there is no such thing as “phenomenal duration” 
in this sense. Thinking about why this is will help us get in view a better picture of 
subjective duration. More specifically, I will be arguing against what I’ll call the 
“Phenomenal Metric view”1. On this view experiences are arranged in phenomenal time, 
meaning they have a property “phenomenal duration”, which has the following features: 
(1) It is a phenomenal property – it is an aspect of what it is like to have an 
experience. 
(2) It belongs to temporally extended chunks of the stream of consciousness. 
(3) It provides, at least roughly, a metric on the stream. 
(4) It has to do with how long an experience feels to a subject. 
I will argue that there is no such property: although it is possible to make sense of 
different subjective rates of passage, this should not be understood in terms of experience 
flowing at different rates as measured by an intrinsic phenomenal metric. I will argue for 
an alternative conception which I call the Retrospective View. On this view, the closest 
thing temporally extended experiences have to phenomenal duration is an extrinsic 
response-dependent property I’ll call “retrospective apparent duration”: roughly, how 
long the experience seems to have lasted retrospectively.  
Although I think this is the correct view, I also think that accepting it may require giving 
up some deeply held intuitions about experience and time that I will attempt to articulate. 
In particular, our normative views about the values of different experiences require being 
able to measure quantities of experience like pleasure and pain; if there is no phenomenal 
metric this becomes problematic, for reasons I will explain. This means that the points I 
will make should be interest not just to those interested in the mind, but also to those 
constructing normative theories in ethics, economics and other areas concerned with 
measuring human welfare. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  See Dainton (2010) for an explicit endorsement of the view, or something close to it. To my 
knowledge, the only other place the issue gets explicitly discussed is Pariyadath and Eagleman 
(2007, 2009), who also argue against something like the Phenomenal Metric view.	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2. Some different notions of Subjective Duration 
Let’s begin by looking a little more carefully at some different ways of precisifying the 
idea of “subjective duration”. The least controversial sense in which there is a difference 
between objective and subjective duration comes from the possibility of duration 
illusions, such as the one involved in the Oddball effect. In this case there is a difference 
between the objective duration of an event and its apparent objective duration. 
Arguably not every subjective difference in temporal experience can be captured in terms 
of this distinction however, because of the possibility of systematic differences in 
temporal experience between organisms in their normal state. If a one second stimulus 
has a different phenomenology for me and a hummingbird, and a similar difference exists 
in a systematic way for other perceivable durations and rates of change, its not clear that 
this requires that one of us is systematically misperceiving. Neither of our perceptual 
apparatuses need in any way be malfunctioning. To make this slightly more precise, 
suppose we have two subjects Quickly and Slowly who differ in this way: in their normal 
states, what it is like for Slowly to experience a stimulus of duration t, is what it is like 
for Quickly to experience a stimulus of duration 2t (provided such a stimulus is within 
Quickly’s perceptual range), and similarly for experiences of other duration-dependent 
phenomena like rates of change. Roughly, Quickly’s experiences are like those that 
Slowly would have, were everything changing twice as quickly as it actually changes. If 
such variation in “subjective rate of passage” can occur, how is it best understood? The 
first point to make is that it motivates a further sense in which there are subjective 
features of experience associated with duration perception, beyond the simple apparent / 
objective duration distinction, because the phenomenology of accurately perceiving a 
certain duration may vary between individuals like Quickly and Slowly. We can call such 
phenomenal properties the “phenomenology of duration experience”. 
What are these phenomenal properties, if they exist? What exactly is the difference 
between subjects like Quickly and Slowly? We shouldn’t automatically assume that if 
such phenomenal properties exist, this is incompatible with an intentionalist treatment of 
duration experience, on which the phenomenal character of perceptual experience is fully 
constituted by the way the scene around the subject would be arranged, were the 
experience veridical – a proposition, or a complex property. The case of Quickly and 
Slowly suggests that the phenomenology of duration experience is not fixed by the 
apparent objective duration of events, but there are other possibilities consistent with 
Intentionalism, such as the view that this phenomenology is fixed by the experience of 
relations between the objective durations of external events and the duration and rates of 
change of internal processes in the brain. An analogy might be spatial experience; one 
plausible view is that we experience relations between the sizes of external objects and 
the size of our body or body parts, rather than experiencing size in a more absolute sense. 
Similarly, if Slowly’s internal clock, or other processes related to measuring time, are 
running systematically faster that Quickly’s, then they might differ in the relational 
temporal properties they can accurately represent external events as having. 
The idea that experience has a relational content such as this deserves extended 
discussion, both in the spatial and temporal cases, but it is not my goal to have that 
discussion here. Instead I want to focus on the idea this duration phenomenology should 
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be thought of in terms of a phenomenal metric – the Phenomenal Metric view (which 
may be consistent with the view that experience has relational duration content). A 
proponent of the existence of a phenomenal duration metric on the stream will naturally 
propose that the phenomenal difference between Quickly and Slowly consists in their 
experiences flowing at different phenomenal rates, and therefore that the phenomenology 
of duration experience can be reduced to phenomenal duration: on this view, the reason 
why an external event appears to unfold more quickly for Quickly is that her experience 
of it unfolds more quickly.  
 
 Fig 1. Subjective and Objective Time, as conceived by Tse et al. (2004). 
The idea is illustrated in the above diagram from Tse et al. (2004) discussing the oddball 
effect. During the illusion, experience is packed more densely in time, as measured by the 
subjective metric (it is not clear whether Tse et al. think of “subjective time” as having all 
the features of phenomenal duration, however). 
On Tse et al.’s view, subjective time is realized by the rate of information processing 
underlying experience, as illustrated in the central part of this diagram. This is an 
example of a tendency to think that there is constitutive connection between the rate of 
flow of experience, and the temporal density or temporal richness of experience, another 
idea related to “subjective duration” that is important to our discussion. For example, we 
might picture Slowly as having more information packed into his experience every 
second than Quickly - perhaps by perceiving more fine grained temporal detail than 
Quickly - or as capable of having more conscious thoughts every second. Later I discuss 
how to relate subjective duration to temporal resolution and other notions of temporal 
richness. In particular one might try to substantiate the idea of a phenomenal metric by 
reducing it to a measure of temporal richness. I will explain later in the paper why I’m 
skeptical about this idea. 
The kind of phenomenal metric that I’m interested in debunking here would be an 
intrinsic property of temporally extended portions of experience. Although I think there 
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is no such measure – or at least not one that plays the role that we would like phenomenal 
duration to play – I do think that there is an extrinsic property of extended experiences, 
whose existence contributes to our sense that there is also an intrinsic measure. This 
extrinsic property is a matter of how long an experience seems retrospectively. Just as 
external events have experienced durations, we have a sense of the length of our 
experiences themselves. For example, if I have been in pain for 5 minutes, then I have a 
retrospective sense of how long the pain been going on for. Note that 5 minutes of pain 
might seem longer for Slowly than for Quickly, even if we accept the notion that this is 
consistent with neither of them misperceiving the length of the pain. We might want a 
notion of retrospective apparent duration that captures this possibility: perhaps this is a 
matter of them perceiving different relational durational properties, or perhaps “apparent 
duration” in this sense is a primitive secondary quality, or a disposition to produce 
retrospective experiences with a certain duration phenomenology. I won’t adjudicate 
between these different views here. I will refer to this property – whatever it is – as 
retrospective phenomenal duration, to be contrasted with intrinsic phenomenal duration. 
On the Retrospective view, the closest we can get to a property of “experienced duration” 
that belongs to extended experiences is this retrospective property; there is no intrinsic 
phenomenal duration. Although this is the view I will argue for, there are ways in which 
it is quite counterintuitive, which I want to be clear about before we proceed; this will 
also help motivate the discussion for those who are antecedently skeptical about the idea 
of an intrinsic phenomenal metric. 
The intuitions that support the existence of an intrinsic phenomenal metric are best 
brought out by thinking about the role such a metric might play in practical deliberation. 
When making practical deliberations, we are sometimes concerned to quantify the 
amount of a certain kind of experience a scenario would involve. For example, consider 
choosing between an hour of constant pain at a certain intensity, and two hours of pain at 
a certain intensity.  There are various considerations that could be relevant to you here – 
for example, you might choose the shorter pain, in part because it uses up a smaller 
proportion of your day, and you are a busy person. But surely the main reason why the 
one hour pain is preferable, is that it involves less pain.   
What is the relevant sense in which there is less pain on that option? The naïve view to 
take is that there is less pain in the sense that the pain objectively lasts less time. More 
precisely, you might think that the correct way to evaluate the amount of pleasure or pain 
in a given temporally extended episode is to take a function representing the momentary 
intensity of the experience at each time, and integrate it over (objective) time. This 
intuitively powerful idea has been developed in the literature in psychology and 
economics on measuring utility. For example, Kahneman, Wakker and Sarin (1997) 
stress the importance of distinguishing between retrospective assessments of utility, 
prospective assessments of utility, and a measure of “experienced utility” which we get 
by integrating over time a function of momentary utility as measured at different times 
during an experience (for example, by asking subjects to rate the current intensity of an 
experience). The point of measuring “experienced utility” in this sense is that it is 
supposed to be normatively significant, providing a measure of how much utility an 
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episode really contained, as opposed to the utility we may, perhaps erroneously, assign to 
it retrospectively. 
However, although the measure we get by integrating over objective time is prima facie a 
good measure of the quantity of pain, it is not, I believe, the measure most people would, 
on reflection, take to be normatively significant. I think the dimension of integration we 
really care about is not objective duration, but subjective duration (in some sense that will 
need clarifying; there are also complications here related to the fact that people are in 
some ways “duration insensitive” in rating experiences, although this doesn’t ultimately 
matter for the point I’m making here (see footnote)2). This can be seen with the following 
example. Suppose again that you are faced with a choice between two sessions of pain of 
equal constant intensity, except that this time each session objectively lasts the same 
amount of time - one hour, let’s say. Nonetheless, there is an important difference 
between the sessions. In one session, the rate of neural processing in your brain will be 
uniformly sped up by a factor of two just prior to the session. You know that this will 
mean that the hour of pain will be (in some sense) subjectively exactly like two hours of 
pain of the same intensity felt under normal circumstances. So, if the decision between 
the sessions is to be made based on how the sessions will feel subjectively, the situation 
is really exactly like a choice under normal circumstances between two hours and one 
hour of equally intense pain. Common sense says the reasonable choice to make in these 
circumstances would be to select the session in which the pain has a shorter subjective 
duration, despite having the same objective duration, and involve the same intensity of 
pain at each moment.3 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  A well-known phenomenon in this area, first documented by Kahneman (et al.) (1993), is that 
subject’s retrospective judgment about how bad a pain is are well correlated with the intensity of 
its peak and ending, and quite poorly correlated with its duration. For example, subjects actually 
prefer a pain if it is extended with a period of less intense pain! However, these results don’t 
show that people’s reflective view of what matters in deciding between options, is not the amount 
of pain, as measured by integrating intensity over objective or subjective duration. As Kahneman 
himself has emphasized, the preferences people exhibit in these cases violate a basic temporal 
monotonicity principle guiding decision making (you can’t make an option better by adding 
something bad to the end of it), a principle most people presumably would accept on reflection.  
Ariely and Lowenstein (2000) point out that people quite reasonably do not treat duration as 
relevant when communicating to others the value of a past experience, even if they do take this 
into account in prospective decision making. Relatedly, in some prospective decision making 
tasks (as opposed to retrospective evaluation tasks), the value subjects attach to outcomes 
involving different painful experiences has been found to be linearly related to the duration of the 
experiences (Read and Loewenstein (1999)). 
3 Notice that we would make the same verdict regardless of the relative objective lengths of the 
pains: even if one pain is considerably objectively longer than the other, if it has a shorter 
subjective duration, that is a reason to prefer it. If there is large discrepancy in the objective 
lengths of the pains, other factors relevant to the decision come into play: as I mentioned, the 
objectively longer pain may be more inconvenient because it takes up more of your time. The 
point here is that being subjectively shorter is one very important reason to prefer a pain, even if 
it has to be balanced against other considerations.  
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The idea of a phenomenal duration metric seems tailor made to make sense of these 
preferences. Intuitively, there is an intrinsic difference between these pains with different 
subjective durations that is an aspect of what it feels like to have the experience, has to do 
with the felt duration of the experience, and which allows us to quantify an amount of 
pain in each case. But despite the naturalness of this interpretation, I think is wrong, as I 
have said; in fact I think there is no straightforward way to quantify the amount of 
experience you have over time in a way does justice to our intuitions about this, because 
these intuitions assume that extended experiences have “felt duration” in an intrinsic 
sense. I think that extended experiences only have “felt duration” in the extrinsic sense 
described above. At the end of the paper I will discuss in more detail the ways in which 
this might require rejecting very plausible ideas concerning how to quantify pains and 
pleasures. Despite such revisionary consequences, I think that the arguments against the 
Phenomenal Metric view are strong enough to warrant rejecting it and accepting my 
alternative. 
I now turn to presenting these arguments. I will advance several kinds of considerations 
against the Phenomenal Metric view. First, the Phenomenal Metric view predicts that 
duration illusions are “global” rather than “local”, in a sense I will explain, a prediction 
which may conflict with the existing empirical evidence on the topic. Second, the 
existence of phenomenal time conflicts with my preferred “atomistic” view of temporal 
perception and the temporal organization of experience, a view that I will contrast with 
“extensional” views, which are much more accommodating to a phenomenal metric. 
Thirdly, I will also argue that attempts to vindicate phenomenal time by reducing it to 
other measures of “experiential density” – for example, to various different ways of 
measuring the amount of information flowing through awareness per second, do not 
work.  
3.  Local and Global Duration Illusions 
Note that on the Phenomenal Metric view, distortions in subjective duration are a global 
phenomenon, because there is a single subjective metric associated with the whole 
stream. So if a visual duration illusion occurs, the theory predicts a subjective stretching 
or warping across sense-modalities will occur, so that any simultaneous experiences in 
other parts of the conscious field will also be warped. However, it is not clear that this 
prediction is consistent with what we actually find. Parayidath and Eagleman (2007) 
explicitly discuss this prediction of the phenomenal duration model, and present evidence 
against it. For example, an auditory oddball does not cause a correlated subjective 
stretching in vision: in particular, it does not cause a simultaneous visual flicker to be 
perceived as having a lower frequency.  
In general, we would only expect a global correlation of different duration percepts if 
there is a single timing mechanism in the brain that is responsible for all temporal 
processing associated with consciousness. But much evidence points to the alternative 
view that there are specialized timing mechanisms at different temporal scales and both 	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across and within modalities, suggesting that duration illusions need not global (see 
Mauk and Buanomano (2004) and Grondin (2010) for reviews). 
The proponent of a phenomenal metric could respond by retreating to a view on which 
there isn’t a single phenomenal metric, but different metrics associated with different 
modalities, or even with different aspects of a single modality. Rather than thinking of the 
stream of consciousness as like a single textured piece of rubber that can be stretched 
different amounts in different places, we revert to an image of it as a fabric of interwoven 
pieces of rubber that can be independently stretched. Such a view complicates the 
phenomenal picture, and raises embarrassing questions like: exactly how many 
independently stretchable sub-streams does consciousness have? Rather than pursuing 
such objections to this version of the Phenomenal Metric view, however, I will proceed 
by explaining another, perhaps more fundamental reason why the view is wrong: it is 
inconsistent with my preferred “Atomic” view of how experience is organized in time.  
4. The Atomic View, the Extensional View and Phenomenal Duration 
If experiences are organized by a phenomenal metric into “phenomenal time”, then we 
could in principle extract a single narrative concerning how the world appears to be 
playing out in time by looking at the organization of your experiences in phenomenal 
time. However, I believe that the view that experiences are organized in this way is 
fundamentally mistaken. Instead, I adopt what I call the “Atomic” view of temporal 
experience. 
Unfortunately, I will not be able to give a very full argument for the Atomic view, or a 
very detailed elucidation of what the view consists in – I do this elsewhere (Lee 
(manuscript), Lee (forthcoming). Grush (2005) also defends a version of the view). Here 
I will have to rely on a quick intuitive characterization of the view, and its main 
opposition, the so called “Extensional” view, which I think is implied by the existence of 
a phenomenal metric. The Atomic Theorist and the Extensional Theorist agree that we 
have experiences as of temporal phenomena like duration and temporal order (for dissent 
on this see Chuard (2011)), but disagree about how these experiences are themselves 
organized in time, and how it is that they present these temporal features. On the Atomic 
view, an experience of a temporally structured array of events, such as A happening 
before B, does not itself have any temporal structure at the experiential level; for 
example, it does not have as distinct temporal parts your experience of A, and your 
experience of B; these experiences happen at the same time, even though they present A 
and B as happening at different times. The temporal structure is in the content of the 
experience, not in the objective temporal structure of the experience itself: 
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 Fig. 2 – the Atomic View. 
On this view, the stream of consciousness is a series of such atomic temporal windows. 
We can talk about the experience you had during, say, a five minute period of time, but 
this is really just a way of talking about the series of atomic experiences you had during 
this time. Each Atom might be associated with “subjective time” in the sense that it 
presents events as having a certain temporal appearance. But there is a separate 
“subjective time” associated with each atom, not a single dimension that structures 
experiences across time. 
Two important clarifications of the view are necessary (see Lee (manuscript) for more 
detail). First, such Atomic experiences need not be instantaneous. In fact, my view is that 
all experiences are realized by temporally extended physical processes in the brain, and 
that this means that they are themselves extended in time. This is consistent with Atomic 
view, because an Atomic experience could be realized by a complex physical process, 
without having shorter experiences as proper temporal parts. In particular, the temporal 
stages of the realizing process might be too short lived to realize any experiences. 
Second, such temporally extended atoms might overlap in time (even if they don’t 
overlap by sharing temporal parts) forming a kind of messy continuum rather than a finite 
series of discrete bursts. So there is a distinction between an Atomic view, and a 
“discrete” view of experience. 
The Atomic view contrasts with an Extensional View, on which temporal experiences are 
experiential processes, rather than experiential atoms. On this view, a temporal 
experience has proper experiential parts whose organization in time in some way reflects 
the temporal content of the experience (the view is developed and defended in detail in 
Dainton (2000, 2010)): 
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 Fig. 3 : the Extensional view. This diagram depicts process-like temporal 
 experiences as disjoint from one another, but the view is perfectly consistent with 
 them overlapping by sharing temporal parts (as they do on Dainton’s (2000) 
 “Overlap” model). 
Elsewhere (Lee (manuscript)) I discuss in detail what exactly is involved in holding an 
Extensional View. In some ways the terminology here is unfortunate, because there a 
number of different claims that Extensional Theorists like Dainton typically want to make 
that are best kept separate. For our purposes, the important claims that are relevant are 
what I call the Process View and the Mirroring View (Phillips (2010)). On the Process 
View, temporal experiences are processes with experiences as proper temporal parts. On 
the stronger Mirroring View, there is a structural correspondence between the temporal 
parts of the process-experience and the temporal parts of the perceived scene. For 
example, if you perceive a number of sounds that form a melody, then your experience 
contains separate experiences of each sound as distinct temporal parts of the overall 
unified experience. Stronger forms of mirroring may obtain; in particular, the matching 
may be required to be order or duration preserving: for example, the order of your 
experiences of the sounds and the experienced order of the sounds may be required to be 
the same. Here I will not assume that these stronger forms of matching are part of the 
Extensional view, in fact I want to consider a development of the view on which the 
temporal parts of an Extensional experience are organized in both objective time and in 
phenomenal time, allowing for a dissociation between, e.g. the objective duration of an 
experience and the experience of duration that it involves (Fig. 4). 
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 Fig. 4 – The Extensional View with a phenomenal duration metric. 
Since phenomenal time provides a different measure on the stream from objective time, 
the experience of the melody can be warped and stretched phenomenally in various 
different ways, consistent with it having a particular objective temporal structure (we 
could even allow phenomenal order and objective order to come apart).  
The important point here is that the idea of a phenomenal metric can easily be combined 
with an Extensional View in such a way that there is a direct correspondence between the 
phenomenal duration of an extended experience and the phenomenology of experiencing 
the duration of some external event. Experiences of different durations correspond to 
different segments of the stream with different phenomenal durations4. 
The same is not true on the Atomic view. On this view, duration phenomenology is not a 
property of extended portions of the stream, rather it is a property of individual atoms. 
Indeed, it is really only the atoms that have any phenomenal properties at all – at best, 
extended portions of the stream have derivative phenomenal features that supervene on 
the phenomenal properties of the atoms, and so are only “experiences” in a derivative 
sense. Each atomic temporal window may present events with different durations, and 
each such duration experience will have a certain phenomenology associated with it, and 
it might even be correct to think that each of these windows has associated with it a 
dimension of “subjective time” in which the presented events are organized. But this 
“subjective time” is a feature of a single atom, not of an extended series of experiences; 
and we will associate a different subjective time with each atom (see fig. 2). For this 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 An important part of the Extensional view that I haven’t mentioned is that some segments of the 
stream may be too long to count as a single experience, and therefore to involve any experience 
of duration. We only have an “experience” in the relevant sense if all the parts of the experience 
are unified, and unity may only obtain over fairly short periods of time, corresponding to the 
maximum duration that can be presented in a single experience. This means that longer stretches 
of experience many only have phenomenal duration in an extended sense – but I do not think 
there is any difficulty in extending the notion in this way. 
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reason, the Atomic view suggests that there is no such thing as phenomenal duration, 
understood as a global phenomenal metric that gives extended portions of experience an 
intrinsic felt duration; only atoms have intrinsic felt duration. 
The fact that on the atomic view temporal phenomenology is a feature of individual 
atoms is reflected in the fact that the atomic view (but not the extensional view) allows 
for a kind of Dennettian “redrafting” in experience from one moment to the next (see 
Dennett and Kinsbourne (1997), Grush (2005)). Rather than there being a single narrative 
about perceived events that can be extracted from your experiences over time, it is 
possible that two events are presented as having one temporal relationship one moment, 
and then a moment later you are presented with a different relationship as the brain 
revises its estimate of what happened. On the atomic view, unlike on the Phenomenal 
Metric view, there may be no definitive way in which perceived events are organized in 
“subjective time”.  
The Atomic view is not inconsistent with the idea that there is a systematic difference 
between Quickly and Slowly. For the Atomist, it can be conceived of as a difference in 
the phenomenal character of the atomic experiences they are disposed to have under 
different circumstances. For example, if they both perceive a 500 msc tone, they may 
both have an atomic experience (or more likely a series of experiences) that presents the 
tone, but it’s duration will have a different phenomenal appearance for each of them. In 
this sense, we can say that time passes at a different rate for them, although their rate of 
passage is not to be understood in terms of a phenomenal metric; it is a disposition to 
have certain kinds of atomic experiences caused by certain kinds of temporal phenomena. 
Note that one kind of atomic experience that will be particularly salient here is a 
retrospective experience of how long an experience (such as the pain experiences 
discussed above) has been going on for. The Atomic view is consistent with these 
retrospective experiences having a systematically different phenomenology for Quickly 
and Slowly, and so their extended experiences having different “felt duration” at least in 
an extrinsic sense. 
Why, in brief, do I prefer the Atomic view? There are a number of considerations that tell 
in its favor, which I describe in detail in Lee (manuscript) and Lee (fortcoming). In my 
opinion, the most fundamental reason for preferring Atomism concerns how time is 
represented in the brain – I call this the “Trace Integration Argument”. Theorists 
proposing computational models of how different kinds of temporal information are 
extracted from a stimulus assume that we start with an input (like a pattern of retinal 
stimulation) in which “time is coded by time” in some sense, and the task of the 
computational process is to compare or integrate the different temporal stages of the 
input, recoding the temporal information into a form where it is explicitly represented all 
at once.  I would claim that temporal experiences are realized by the output of such a 
process of trace integration, and are therefore realized by representations that code all at 
once how the world is changing over time. This in turn is a reason for saying that they 
have an Atomic, not a process-like structure. 
There is much more to be said about this argument, and I try to spell it out in other work 
(Lee (manuscript)). Here I will assume that Atomism is the correct view of the temporal 
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organization of experience, and try to further develop a view of subjective duration that is 
consistent with it.  
I argued that the Atomic view rules out the Phenomenal Metric view. A fan of a 
phenomenal duration metric may respond by trying to find ways to reconcile the views. 
In particular, the following idea might seem promising: we might try to find a measure of 
the density in time of experiential atoms, and hold that this can be integrated over time to 
get a measure on the stream that fits the job description of phenomenal duration – a 
derivative property that would supervene on the properties of the atoms. Given the point 
already made that duration phenomenology is a property of atoms and not of extended 
portions of the stream, it is already dubious whether any such measure could satisfy the 
phenomenal duration job description. However, despite this point, it is illuminating to 
consider the idea in some detail, which brings us to the next section. 
5. Phenomenal Duration and Experiential Density 
As mentioned above, when we reflect on the idea of slow-motion or high-speed 
experiences, one salient aspect of them is that they seem to involve either more or less 
temporal detail in a subject’s experience per objective unity of time than in a normal 
experience. This leads naturally to the idea that subjective duration is in some way 
constitutively tied to temporal richness or density of conscious experience. It is not 
implausible that this could provide the elusive phenomenal measure we are interested in: 
it clearly has to do with what experience is like subjectively and ‘how much’ experience 
we have in a certain sense. Furthermore, there seems to be no reason why an Atomist 
could not acknowledge some such measure on experience. So perhaps the proponent of 
the Phenomenal Metric view can explain how their view is after all consistent with 
Atomism by proposing that phenomenal duration can be reduced to some such density 
measure. 
An example in the literature where some such connection between information density 
and phenomenal duration is made is in Stetson et al. (2007). They tried to experimentally 
test the hypothesis that extreme stress can change the subjective rate of time’s passage, as 
if often anecdotally reported. They reasoned that if time really does slow down under 
such circumstances then this would allow subjects to perceive the world with a higher 
temporal resolution than normal. To test whether stress improves temporal resolution, 
they tested for an improvement in visual temporal resolution in subjects entering free fall 
by throwing themselves off a raised platform (while falling, the subjects viewed a display 
rapidly alternating at a rate marginally too fast to discern in a normal resting state). It was 
found that this stressful situation did not improve temporal resolution, although subjects 
did retrospectively judge that their own jump lasted much longer than they would judge 
someone else’s jump to have taken. Stetson et al. conclude that there is no occurrent 
change in a subject’s experience during the fall, merely a retrospective sense that 
experience was longer than it really was - a view not unlike my retrospective view 
(although there are important differences). 
Stetson et al. assume that if there were an occurrent change in a subject’s experience of 
time passing during the fall, this would be at least partly constituted by a change in 
perceptual temporal resolution – a measure of the informational richness of experience. 
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One could object that there might not be such a tight connection between subjective rate 
of temporal passage and temporal resolution – an objection that I would be sympathetic 
with. I’ll return to this momentarily – for now, we can think of Stetson et al.’s discussion 
as an illustration of the tendency to link phenomenal duration and experiential density. 
How to measure information flow is a puzzling issue – is there an objective number of 
bits per second entering into your conscious mind? There are at least the following 4 
distinct measures of “information” that might be relevant here: 
(1) The prior probability of the scenario presented to you by the experience (this is 
the “amount of information” in Shannon’s sense, usually represented as “bits” on 
a logarithmic scale). 
(2) The size of the representation underlying your experience, as given, for example, 
the number of binary yes/no questions that have to be answered to ascertain what 
you are perceiving, or the number of mental symbols used to represent a 
perceived scene. 
(3) Spatial or temporal resolution (as in Stetson et al.): roughly, a measure of how 
fine-grained in time or space the discriminations of a perceptual system are. 
(4) The number or arrangement of events used as “temporal cues” present in your 
experience. 
The notion of a “temporal cue” deserves some explanation: roughly, the idea is that 
systems involved in time perception have priors for how many salient perceptual “events” 
happen per second, or how processes of familiar kinds tend to play out in time (think, for 
example, of speech perception). Duration is then gauged my applying these priors to 
information about the arrangement in time of the cue events (Tse (2004), for example, 
suggests that attention could expand the subjective duration of time by causing more 
temporal cues to be detected).  
I should also note that I am not claiming that all of these four measures are actually well-
defined for experiences of different kinds, merely that they are the notions that we might 
naturally look at in this area. 
Rather than discussing these notions individually, I want to make a general point about 
their potential role in explaining temporal experience. It is crucial to realize that there are 
two very different ways of connecting information flow (in any of these senses) with 
duration phenomenology. We need to distinguish a constitutive and a causal sense in 
which information flow can be linked with temporal experience or temporal perception.  
On the constitutive view, phenomenal duration just is the amount of information 
presented in experience during a certain period (or a function of “experiential density” in 
some non-informational sense). The idea is to reduce phenomenal duration to something 
else (I believe that Eagleman and Pariyadath’s recent (2009) suggestion that subjective 
duration just is “energy consumed” by certain perceptual processes, is a view in this 
category; Eagleman & Pariyadath intend energy consumed to be an index of information 
flow).  
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On the causal view, rate of information flow plays a causal role in the tracking of time’s 
passage. The idea would be that the rate of information flow is a quantity that is used as 
part of a time-keeping mechanism: rather than having dedicated oscillations or temporal 
regularities set up to allow the measurement of duration, the brain exploits the fact that 
processes not primarily dedicated to tracking time have their own invariant temporal 
features that can in principle be used to measure duration. (One could think of this as a 
version of the temporal cue idea, where the brain is implicitly using priors about the 
temporal relationships between events of certain kinds to track time, where now the 
relevant events are neural events rather than external perceived events). On this view the 
experience of duration is not constituted by anything related to informational density, 
rather the mechanism that allows the tracking of time happens, as contingent matter of 
fact, to use informational density as a temporal cue. (See Ivry and Schlerf (2008) for a 
review of dedicated vs intrinsic timing mechanisms). 
A serious problem with attempts to reduce phenomenal duration to informational richness 
(in any sense), it seems to me, is that the link between the two is far more plausible when 
understood in the weaker causal sense than in the constitutive sense. There are a number 
of salient points here. Recall that phenomenal duration is a measure of the quantity of 
experience that one has that is somehow supposed to reflect a feeling of how long an 
experience lasts: thus it is constitutively linked to duration perception. However, 
presumably your experiences could have a certain level of informational density even if 
mechanisms involved in tracking time were completely disabled5. Informational density 
only results in duration perception if it is hooked up to a larger clock mechanism that is 
explicitly registering this information flow and using it as a measure of time. Suppose we 
had a creature whose experiences involve flow of information, but who is not equipped 
with such internal clocks. Would their experiences have phenomenal duration? If so, then 
we have to give up on the claim that phenomenal duration is constitutively linked to the 
perception of duration, which seems implausible. 
In response to this, one might claim that information density is a necessary component of 
phenomenal duration, which must also play a certain functional role in tracking time to 
be involved in temporal phenomenology. So it is constituitively linked to temporal 
perceptual experience, even if it can occur in a being that has no such experience. But 
against this, surely temporal perception is at best only contingently underwritten by 
mechanisms that track the rate of information flow: surely there could be a conscious 
being whose perception of duration was instead underwritten exclusively by time-
dedicated circuits that do not exploit information flow. So information flow is neither 
necessary nor sufficient for temporal experience. 
There is a connection between these points, and the Trace Integration argument for the 
Atomic view I briefly outlined in the last section. If information flow did play a causal 
role in tracking duration, this would presumably be through the operation of an 
accumulator mechanism that measured how much information is processed between an 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 This point is not correct if temporal richness is understood as temporal resolution, which 
requires temporal perception – but the suggestion that rate of passage is constituted by temporal 
resolution is problematic for other reasons I give. 
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onset and offset point, and therefore indirectly, how much time has passed. An explicit 
representation of duration would be realized by the output of the accumulator, which 
would therefore be a better candidate for what underwrites a duration experience, than the 
extended information flow between onset and offset. If a duration experience is 
underwritten by this simultaneously integrated accumulator output, it is presumably an 
atomic experience of duration, not an extensional experience. Further, this atomic 
experience of duration would be only causally related to the amount of information 
contained in your experiences between onset and offset; but to be phenomenal duration, a 
measure on experience needs to be constitutively linked to the experience of duration. 
There are less general considerations that also tell against identifying information flow 
with phenomenal duration. One important point is that most of the measures of 
information flow I can think of are likely to give different measures of information flow 
for experiences in different modalities, or in one modality in different circumstances, 
despite the fact that we would not suppose time to be flowing at different rates in each 
case. Consider the fact that hearing has much higher temporal resolution than vision: 
despite this fact, time does not seem to pass more slowly in hearing than in vision. 
Similarly, it does not appear that a sudden reduction in spatial or temporal resolution in a 
certain modality (e.g. of the kind that would occur if I took my glasses off) immediately 
causes time to appear to speed up (compare how taking your glasses off doesn’t suddenly 
make everything look smaller, despite a reduction in spatial resolution). Similarly, if I 
simply close my eyes, thus massively reducing the amount of information flowing 
through consciousness, this doesn’t make time speed up. Finally, many of these measures 
of information flow are only applicable to perceptual experience in particular; but 
intuitively there could be subjective duration in a purely non-perceptual form of 
consciousness – for example, in a form of consciousness that involved only mental 
images, thoughts, and sensations like pains. Perhaps we can find a notion of Experiential 
Density that applies in these non-perceptual cases, but I suspect that the same general 
point will apply : that the relevant kind of density is at most contingently associated with 
temporal experience as part of a time-keeping mechanism. 
It is true that certain kinds of information flow have been argued to be correlated with 
subjective duration, on the basis of experimental evidence. For example, as I already 
mentioned, Tse (et al) (2004) suggest that the Oddball effect is caused by increased 
attention to the Oddball stimulus, resulting in more temporal cues for duration being 
detected than normal. And Eagleman and Pariyadath (2009) suggest that the effect is 
explained by a shortening of subjective duration in the stimuli immediately proceeding 
the oddball, due to an increase in coding efficiency known as “repetition suppression”. 
The idea is that is that subjective duration is correlated with how hard the system has to 
work to process information about a stimulus, and that repetition increases efficiency. 
The point I would make is that both these hypotheses are more plausibly interpreted in 
the causal rather than constitutive way (although admittedly, Eagleman & Pariyadath do 
seem to intend a constitutive reading). Unless temporal cues or energy expended are 
wired up to play a causal role in keeping track of time, they will not be in involved in 
explaining the subjective sense of how long an experience lasts. 
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The point here is not that information flow is not an interesting way to measure how 
much experience you have, but rather that it is not a measure that is constitutively linked 
to temporal perception in the right way to constitute phenomenal duration. It is 
reasonable to want your experiences to convey as much information about the world as 
possible, both as a means to other goals, and as an end in itself: one might think that 
richer experiences are intrinsically preferable to more impoverished ones. But it would be 
a mistake to think that such measures are more than indirectly related to our sense of how 
fast time is passing, or “how much” – in a subjective temporal sense - of a certain kind of 
experience we have had (such as a pain). 
To sum up, attempts to save phenomenal duration by reducing it to a measure of 
experiential density in terms of information flow do not work. This does not definitively 
show that the experiential density idea does not work, because there might be other ways 
of measuring it other than in terms of perceptual information flow6. But I suspect a 
similar point would apply to any suggested measure – it only has a connection with 
duration phenomenology if there is a cognitive clock using this measure to keep track of 
time; but then the relevant density measure is only causally, not constitutively linked with 
the experience of duration. 
This is the final part of my case against the existence of a phenomenal duration metric. In 
short, I have argued that the Atomic view is inconsistent with experiences being 
organized in “Phenomenal Time”, and that attempts to reconstruct the idea of a 
phenomenal metric in terms of the temporal richness of experience do not work. In the 
last section, I consider an important problem that my positive view generates. 
6. Is Subjective Duration Response-Dependent? The Paradox of Subjective Time. 
I have argued against the existence of a phenomenal duration metric – but how are we to 
understand the difference between subjects like Quickly and Slowly if not in terms of 
phenomenal duration? As I said, I think the most important difference between them is 
that they are disposed to have phenomenally different experiences of the same durations 
and rates of change. There is an important question about what these atomic phenomenal 
differences consist in, but rather than pursue it here (it is a complex question that requires 
a long discussion in its own right), I want to look in this last section in more detail at the 
possibly revisionary consequences of holding this view. In particular, as we saw above, 
the quantity of pain, pleasure, or other kinds of experience a situation involves seems a 
relevant factor in deciding whether it is better or worse than other situations. A 
phenomenal metric helps to make sense of this idea. Furthermore, as I will now argue, if 
there is no such metric, this makes it difficult to quantify experiences in a way that makes 
sense of our prima facie normative views about the values of different experiences. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  For example, Phillips (2012) suggests that subjective duration is in some way linked to the 
amount of non-perceptual conscious “mental activity” that a subject enjoys during a period of 
time. My point would be that this is only viable if there exists a timing mechanism that measures 
conscious mental activity as a way of measuring time – conscious mental activity does not on its 
own entail any experience of duration. 
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To see this, let’s go back to thinking about the case of the two pains that I mentioned in 
section 1. We noted that, intuitively, even if two pains have the same constant intensity 
and last the same amount of time, there can still be reason to prefer one over the other, if 
one of them has a shorter subjective duration. For example, if both pain A and pain B last 
an hour, but pain B is subjectively just like a 5 minute pain, you should go with pain B. 
In what sense might there be an experiential difference between pain A and pain B? 
When we address this question from the perspective of the Atomic Theorist, we are led to 
the rather paradoxical conclusion that there may after all be no relevant intrinsic 
phenomenal difference between them! For example, if Quickly and Slowly both 
experience 5 minutes of equally intense pain, arguably there is no relevant difference 
between their extended experiences, even though time is passing much faster for Quickly 
than for Slowly. How so? Well, at each moment their experience is characterized by their 
feeling pain at the same intensity. Because Atomism is true, their experience over time 
supervenes on their experience at each individual moment. Moreover, the pains last the 
same amount of objective time, so there is a simple phenomenology-preserving mapping 
between their pains at each instant. In this sense, paradoxically, the pains are exactly the 
same in relevant respects (see fig. 5). 
 
 Figure 5. The “Paradox” of Subjective Duration 
If the Phenomenal Metric View was correct, this would not be the right conclusion. Even 
if the pains were the same at each moment, there would remain the fact that they have 
different phenomenal durations – a further phenomenal feature of extended portions of 
pain, which does not supervene on their moment-by-moment phenomenal character. But 
on the Atomic view there is only the moment-by-moment phenomenal character. This is 
what creates the paradoxical conclusion. 
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To be clear, it is only the pains themselves that are being said to match each other in this 
way. During the 5 minute period, Slowly may be capable of having more thoughts than 
Quickly; and if at any point each reflects on how long its been since the pain started, it 
may seem to Slowly that more time has passed. The point is that relations to mental states 
such as these are all extrinsic properties of the pains, whereas intuitively there is a 
relevant intrinsic difference between them. It is this that the Atomist can arguably not 
accommodate.  
I will say more about this shortly. First, note that the “matching phenomenology” point 
generalizes to portions of experience of a single normal subject. If (as I have argued) the 
objective duration of an experience is not a phenomenally relevant feature of it, there is a 
sense in which 5 minutes of pain felt at a constant intensity by a normal subject is 
qualitatively identical to 15 minutes of pain felt at the same intensity by the same subject. 
There is a phenomenology preserving mapping from the momentary states of the 5 
minute experience at time t after onset, to the stages of the 15 minute experience at time 
3t after onset. So, given that the difference in objective duration is not phenomenally 
relevant, there is no intrinsic experiential difference between these extended pains.  
Is this a sufficiently strange conclusion that we should reject one of the assumptions that 
lead to it, such as the Atomic view, or our rejection of phenomenal duration?  
It might be suggested that the problem is generated by an assumption that there are only 
instantaneous experiences. What if the Atomist instead claimed that each atom is 
temporally extended (as I suggested above that they should)? I don’t think this makes any 
difference. Imagine, for example, taking pain A and pain B and replacing each 
instantaneous slice with an extended atom that has the same phenomenal character, but 
which lasts 1 ms and is centered on the same time as the instantaneous slice was. We get 
something like a “continuous” series of temporally overlapping atoms, rather than a 
continuous series of slices. But it is hard to see how merely changing the objective 
duration of each slice in this way could make any difference to the problem we are 
dealing with: we will still have the relevant phenomenology preserving mappings. 
Another natural suggestion is that pain A and pain B differ in that at each moment there 
is a phenomenology of time passing at a certain rate, a rate that is faster for Quickly than 
it is for Slowly. One could develop this in terms of experiential richness or information 
flow, an idea already dealt with above. A further problem for this idea, perhaps more 
important in the present context, is that if there is such a thing as a rate or density of 
experience flowing through time, it is not a phenomenal property, and therefore not a 
phenomenal property of atomic pain experiences that could be integrated over time to get 
a phenomenal metric. What I mean is that two subjects can have moment-by-moment 
qualitatively identical experiences, despite enjoying different subjective rates of 
experiential flow. For example, suppose Slowly watches a 2 hour movie, and Quickly 
watches an accelerated version of the movie that lasts only 1 hour. Quickly’s and 
Slowly’s experiences might be qualitatively identical in the sense that Q’s experiences at 
t minutes into the movie might be subjectively just like Slowly’s experiences at 2t 
minutes into the movie, despite the fact that they are experiencing time passing at 
different rates. That phenomenal rate of passage is not a phenomenal property is actually 
something that drops out of the Phenomenal Metric View – on that view “rate of flow” is 
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a function of both phenomenal time – a phenomenal property – and objective time – not a 
phenomenal property. It is the number of units of phenomenal time that pass per unit of 
objective time. But even if we reject phenomenal duration as a basic phenomenal 
property, the point remains good. 
Given the failure of these responses to the problem, the only way to resist the 
“paradoxical” conclusion, I would suggest, is to reject Atomism and embrace the view 
that the phenomenology of experience over time does not supervene on the character of 
momentary states, because there is a phenomenal metric that applies to extended portions 
of the stream. I personally think the case for Atomism is compelling, so I prefer to 
embrace the seemingly paradoxical conclusion. We need to be candid, however, about 
why taking the felt duration of an extended experience to be extrinsic is revisionary of 
common sense. Consider the following three points: 
First of all, it doesn’t appear that changing the character of one’s retrospective impression 
is a way to change how bad a session of pain is, because it is not a way of changing the 
intrinsic features of the pain. For example, being told that after a session of pain, before 
you have time to reflect back on the pain, someone will intervene to make it seem like the 
pain was very short, hardly serves to make the pain any more preferable. The situation is 
perhaps illuminatingly compared with the case of the existence of pain, rather than the 
amount of pain you suffer. Certain anaesthetics are said to operate not by preventing pain 
as it is inflicted, but by preventing the subject of the pain from remembering it 
afterwards. What is disturbing about this, of course, is that a pain still exists regardless of 
whether or not you remember it. Furthermore, it seems wrong to say that a pain not 
remembered is a pain not worth caring about – a lack of memory may mitigate bad 
effects like painful memories, but it doesn’t render the pain completely “harmless”, so to 
speak. The Retrospective theorist appears to be taking a view that is implausibly similar 
to a view on which the existence or negative utility of pain depends on the existence of 
later memories. 
Second, how long a pain seems to last retrospectively might depend on when we reflect 
back on the pain. During the moments after the pain, our retrospective impression of it 
might even change quite dramatically. So it seems as if there is isn’t such as a thing as the 
retrospective duration of a pain, but rather many such retrospective durations. But isn’t 
there some way of quantifying the amount of pain that isn’t variable in this way? Related 
to this is the fact that I might simply have no retrospective impression of the length of the 
pain at all. Perhaps the intensity of the pain was completely disorienting, so that I have no 
sense of how long it went on for. Does that mean that there’s no sense at all in which the 
pain had a quantifiable “subjective duration”? 
Third, if Quickly and Slowly have different retrospective impressions of the duration of 
their pains, and these retrospective impressions are both veridical impressions of some 
feature of the pains (and so not straightforwardly just impressions of objective duration), 
we can ask : what feature is this? It would appear that the pains must have some 
distinguishing feature other than their relation to different retrospective impressions, 
otherwise there will be nothing for these retrospective impressions to be about. A 
proponent of a phenomenal duration metric might claim that surely the most plausible 
candidate for such a remembered feature would be phenomenal duration itself. But what 
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should the Retrospectivist say that a retrospective impression of duration is an impression 
of? 
On this third point, the Retrospective Theorist does have a reasonable reply. They can say 
that retrospective impressions of the duration of experiences are just one case of duration 
impressions in general, which are not typically directed at experiences but rather at 
external events. When Quickly has a an impression of the duration of some physical 
event in the environment which is different from the impression that Slowly has, we can 
also ask what feature of the event Quickly is perceiving, and again it seems that it is not 
simply the objective duration of the event. But we cannot say that this physical event has 
phenomenal duration, because it isn’t an experience. In so far as we think that the 
phenomenology of Quickly’s experience has to be explained as a relation to some 
property of the event, I think the property will have to be a relation between the objective 
duration of the event and some feature of Quickly himself, such as the rate of neural 
processes in his head that are used to track time. As I suggested above, saying what more 
specifically this relational property might be is an interesting and tricky issue which I will 
not pursue here. The point is that whatever it is, it may be the kind of property that 
experiences themselves can have, and which we can say is what is represented in 
retrospective impressions of duration. 
On the first and second points, I see no option but to just accept these consequences. I 
used to think that these points were sufficiently costly to warrant rejecting the 
Retrospective View, but now I don’t think this. Importantly, I think that the retrospective 
theorist can say that there is nothing that we can introspect that directly contradicts their 
view. In so far as we think that there is an intrinsic difference between 5 minutes of pain 
and an hour of pain, this is a theoretical assumption that we might very naturally make, 
but not one that is required to explain the introspective data. Given that the Retrospective 
view fits the empirical facts better (as I have tried to argue), we should believe it even 
though it conflicts with these deeply embedded ideas. 
If the subjective duration of experiences is response-dependent in this way, how does that 
affect the rationale for different preferences about “quantities” of experiences like pain? 
One possible view is revisionary. It might be pointed out that these preferences assume 
that there is an intrinsic difference between the experiences we are choosing between; 
furthermore, a retrospective impression that a pain lasted a long time is not enough on its 
own to make it worse than some other pain that is not linked to a similar impression. It is 
not the retrospective feeling that we dread, that makes the pain terrible, but the pain itself. 
It can seem as if the truth about subjective duration leaves these preferences peculiarly 
ungrounded, and thus arguably they should be revised.  
This conclusion would of course be disturbing to Hedonists, who think that the value of a 
certain scenario should be calculated by quantifying the amount of pleasure and pain it 
involves. If there is no straightforward way to quantify experiences in a way that is 
relevant to our preferences, the theory is ill-defined. But it is not just Hedonists who 
should be concerned; almost all theories of what matters include quantities of pleasure 
and pain as at least one factor to take into account in calculating the value of a possible 
outcome. If pain and pleasure can’t be intrinsically quantified, we will have to rethink 
this idea. Clearly then, this is a matter of significance to debates about what matters, 
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which in turn has significance for normative debates in ecomonics and other areas 
concerned with measuring people’s welfare; as such it deserves further discussion, which 
I hope to pursue elsewhere. 
 
6. Conclusion 
I have argued that although there are intuitive reasons for believing that experiences exist 
in a dimension of “phenomenal time” that measure how fast experience flows by each 
second, there is in fact no such thing as phenomenal time. The stream of consciousness is 
a series of atomic states that represent temporal structure without themselves having 
significant temporal structure. Duration phenomenology is a feature of these atomic 
states, not of extended portions of the stream of consciousness that can be divided up into 
experiential stages with different phenomenal durations. Moreover, I argued that attempts 
to reduce phenomenal duration to measures of information flow in perception fail 
because the quantities are at best contingently rather than constitutively related. The 
resulting view is that extended experiences only have subjective duration in a thin 
response-dependent sense. This conflicts with certain ideas we naturally have about the 
temporal character of experiences, and threatens to undermine the rationale we give for 
certain preferences between experiences. I argued that these costs are not sufficiently 
great to warrant believing in phenomenal duration. 
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